When GNSS can no longer be trusted
Modern society depends on satellite navigation far more than most people realise. Aircraft, vessels, drones and critical systems rely on signals that can be disrupted or manipulated, sometimes without operators immediately recognising the problem. As GNSS interference becomes a growing concern in Europe, authorities are being forced to ask how prepared they really are.Satellite navigation has become an essential component of modern operations. From aviation and maritime transport to emergency services and unmanned systems, accurate positioning and timing information supports activities that people and organisations depend on every day.
However, increasing attention is being directed towards the vulnerabilities of satellite-based navigation. Reported GNSS interference in parts of Europe, particularly in areas affected by regional security tensions, has highlighted the potential consequences of relying on signals that may not always be available or trustworthy.
When a navigation system gives the wrong answer
Two forms of interference are attracting particular attention: jamming and spoofing. Jamming disrupts satellite signals and can prevent navigation systems from determining their position accurately. Spoofing is different, as manipulated signals can cause equipment to calculate a position that does not reflect its actual location.
Both create operational risks, particularly in environments where accurate navigation and situational awareness are essential.
For drone operators, maritime organisations, aviation authorities and critical infrastructure providers, the challenge is not simply recognising interference. It is understanding how operations can continue safely when navigation or communication systems become unreliable.
The war in Ukraine has also demonstrated how central electronic warfare and spectrum control have become to modern operations. These developments are increasingly relevant to Europe’s wider security and preparedness discussions.
Building resilience in a contested environment
Responding to these challenges requires more than improved detection equipment. Organisations must understand the limitations of their systems, identify operational vulnerabilities and develop procedures for maintaining essential capabilities when interference occurs.
Spectrum monitoring, resilient communications and alternative navigation approaches are therefore becoming increasingly important areas of development.
At Nordic Security Summit 2027, GNSS disruption, electronic warfare, spectrum monitoring and communication resilience will form part of the discussions on emerging security threats.
The summit brings together public safety professionals, defence representatives, researchers and technology specialists to examine how Europe can strengthen its operational resilience.
For organisations depending on reliable navigation and communications, understanding these developments is becoming an essential part of future preparedness.
The conference takes place at Turning Torso in Malmö, Sweden, on 27–28 January 2027.
